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Bringing balance to the force 
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Abstract 
Events from 2008 onwards have bought the old consensus on the sound money and finance 
paradigm (the ‘Great Moderation’) into bold relief. One manifestation of this crisis of belief 
is the increased focus on global imbalances, institutionally reflected in the creation of the 
Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) at the G20 level and subsequently the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure (MIP) at the European Union (EU) level. Comparing both 
newcomers to international macroeconomic policy coordination, this article analyses four 
features that shape (and we show, institutionalise) the process of paradigm contestation: 
presence, position, promotion and plausibility. We argue that although initially the G20‘s 
MAP scored higher in terms of presence, position and promotion, it is the EU’s MIP, which 
heralds a more substantial shift in macroeconomic management. Collectively, both indicate 
the increased prominence of global imbalances as the subject of inter- or supra-national 
management, and a broadening of the notion of necessary or legitimate economic 
governance. 
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 3 
Introduction 
 
The financial crisis provoked chaos within macroeconomic policy making. Prior to 2008, 
a broad consensus on the merits of prioritising low inflation and low deficits was secured 
by the apparent stability of the pre-crisis decades in the developed world. The crisis threw 
the fallacies of this paradigm into stark relief, illuminating systemic risk in corners of the 
economy that lay beyond the conventional boundaries of macroeconomic policy regulation 
and coordination. Faced with the limitations of existing governance strategies in predicting, 
let alone preventing, the economic fallout, policy-makers across the globe sought more 
nuanced and integrated guidelines on macroeconomic management (see IMF, 2010). One 
of the strongest common denominators amongst the crisis narratives was the identification 
of global imbalances as a key source of financial and economic instability (e.g. Frieden, 
2009; Larch, 2011; Willett and Chiu, 2012; Bird, 2013). The creation of the two 
supranational imbalance regimes we consider here, the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) 
and Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), are a direct result of this trend. The MIP 
offers a surveillance mechanism to prevent and correct harmful macroeconomic 
imbalances between countries at the EU level. The MAP establishes a process to evaluate 
and rectify macroeconomic imbalances within the G20. 
 
In this article, we compare these two most recent initiatives in macroeconomic policy 
coordination taken at the supranational level. In so doing we present an analysis of 
institutional creation promoted by a paradigm shift within international macroeconomic 
policy coordination, concerning the (re)discovery of imbalances. Our fundamental research 
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question concerns how these two new policies, created in the wake of crisis to 
institutionalise supranational cooperation, differ in their degrees of embeddedness and 
political support, and why this is so. We also consider where each policy originates from, 
and trace the lineage of the respective ideas that influence their functioning. The structure 
of the article outlines how these ‘consolidated’ policies came about, by detailing first their 
respective policy instruments, and then the comparative circumstances of their emergence 
and institutionalisation. We proceed to argue that the emergence of MAP and MIP has the 
potential to indicate a genuinely new paradigm for macroeconomic policy coordination, 
but that as the two sets of policies show, the consolidation of this paradigm is fundamentally 
dependent on the four features that shape (and we show, institutionalize) the process in 
their respective settings. 
 
Our analysis spans the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the American investment bank whose 
bankruptcy triggered the financial crisis in 2007, to early 2015. This allows us to consider 
the three acts of crises collectively: crisis, experimentation and consolidation (Culpepper 
2008). In the crisis stage, the previous (‘Great Moderation’) paradigm came under severe 
attack. In the experimentation stage, a series of debates occurred amongst both national 
politicians and supranational staff, with the existing presence of ‘imbalance rationales’ 
within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and EU’s regulation proving crucial to the 
political plausibility of fresh regulation. The final act begins with the adoption of a new set 
of policies and institutions, which is to say the application of the newly created imbalances 
procedures at the EU and G20 level, and with their subsequent differential embedding. 
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Theory and approach 
 
In order to explain the differing trajectories of the two efforts at supranational 
macroeconomic coordination, we make use of a framework (the ‘four Ps’) developed by 
Baker (2012). Baker specifies four ‘scoping or enabling conditions that shaped the 
emergence of MPR [macroprudential regulation] as the principal post-crisis regulatory 
interpretative frame’ (2012, p.114), namely presence, professional positioning, promotion 
and persuasion, and plausibility. Both MAP and MIP share with MPR the fundamental 
rationale of ‘protecting the whole’ (Luis and Nier, 2012), but unlike MPR are not 
principally concerned with monitoring financial risk, but rather more holistic imbalances 
within and between national economies. Furthermore, while Baker focuses on the 
conditions which led to MPR becoming accepted as a desirable response to the financial 
crisis (ideational selection), we, conversely, focus on processes of institutional selection 
that mediate the policy frames which emerge from them. In so doing, we show that Baker’s 
framework has considerable purchase beyond the context in which it has so far been used. 
 
Wedded to the analytical framework, our research draws on empirical material gathered 
through 26 semi-structured interviews conducted between 2011 and 2017 with officials 
working on either or both imbalances procedures. Institutionally our interviews span the 
European Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament, Member States’ 
Permanent Representations and the IMF. Face-to-face interviews took place in Brussels 
and Washington DC, whilst two interviews were conducted over the phone. Interviewees 
were selected on the basis of position and involvement with the policy issues here 
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examined. The information gathered during the interviews was explicitly ‘not for 
attribution’, that is to say the information could be used and quoted provided that the 
individual would be granted anonymity. 
 
We focus on MAP and MIP because they are distinctive, amongst measures targeting 
supranational macroeconomic imbalances, for emerging fully as a consequence of the 
crisis. We focus our analysis not on the comparative effectiveness of each policy – that is, 
the problem solving capacity – but on the interaction of different scoping conditions for 
both procedures (in other words, how well each policy has become embedded in its context) 
in order to determine how and why they have become salient. Our choice of both 
institutions and evaluative criteria contrasts with Moschella (2014) who compares the 
IMF’s own macroeconomic surveillance, which predates the crisis, with the EU’s MIP. We 
suggest that MAP is the more insightful comparator to MIP, as although the Fund’s 
experience in macroeconomic surveillance was a significant forerunner for the MIP, it had 
a more direct bearing on the policies of the MAP. MIP, conversely, was grafted onto a set 
of contextually specific ideas that existed within the EU macroeconomic framework, such 
as the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and European Employment Strategy 
(EES). Consequently, we present a rather different account of the relationship between the 
MIP and its intellectual predecessors, as our evidence does not suggest a failure of policy 
learning but rather different political contexts providing more or less fertile ‘seeding 
grounds’ for addressing the issue of imbalances. 
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Comparing MAP and MIP 
 
Both MAP and MIP are notable for involving efforts to address future global 
macroeconomic problems by correcting asymmetries between states. One of the first of 
these responses was orchestrated at the G20 level, which (re)organised in autumn 2008 
with an inaugural summit in Washington D.C., to act as a forum for heads of governments 
to deal with the ramifications of the financial and economic crisis. As part of an attempt to 
coordinate policy responses, leaders agreed on the creation of the Mutual Assessment 
Process (MAP). MAP constitutes the backbone of the initiative launched at the 2009 
Pittsburgh summit (the ‘Framework for Strong Sustainable, and Balanced Growth’). 
Subsequently, a response was also organised at the EU level. The Union’s response to the 
burgeoning debt crisis included a series of new regulations to enhance economic 
governance. The MIP, which came into force in 2011 as part of the so-called Six-Pack, 
established a surveillance procedure to prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances. 
Both of these measures are outlined below. 
 
The MAP describes an in-depth country review, carried out by the IMF and agreed by G20 
leaders, to assess the existence of destabilizing imbalances between countries. G20 leaders 
gauge progress toward the Framework goals via indicative, non-numerical guidelines to 
identify and assess imbalances. The guidelines feature a total of 40 indicators, called G20 
MAP Inputs, spanning 6 groups (domestic variables; monetary and financial policy; fiscal 
policy; labour markets; external development; external variables: see Table 1 below). This 
extensive list intersects with all the original EU’s MIP indicators bar labour costs — 
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although the IMF has recommended a rise in wages as part of a strategy to boost internal 
demand in surplus countries as part of the Mutual Assessment Process. The resulting MAP 
recommendations are legally non-binding and rest solely on the commitment of national 
governments. The variables and indicators used in both processes are in line with those 
found in with similar, prior instruments in the macroeconomic governance toolbox, such 
as the Early Warning Exercise conducted by the IMF (Kaya, 2010). 
 
The new regulations created as part of the MIP established a scoreboard to provide an early-
warning signalling device for potentially harmful macroeconomic imbalances in Member 
States. Analogous to the Stability and Growth Pact, the annual macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure has a preventive arm, where policy recommendations can be issued by the 
Council to tackle imbalances early on, and a corrective arm where ‘excessive’ imbalances 
have been identiﬁed and an action plan is requested from the Member State concerned. 
Non-compliance with the Council recommendations can eventually, at least on paper, lead 
to ﬁnancial sanctions. In the ‘Scoreboard for the Surveillance of Macroeconomic 
Imbalances’ (DG Ecfin, 2012), the Commission stresses that the indicators are neither 
policy targets nor policy instruments. Instead the results of the scoreboard are interpreted 
from an ‘economic perspective’, with thresholds for the indicators merely being a starting 
point to serve as alert levels. The scoreboard contains 11 headline indicators (supplemented 
by 18 auxiliary variables), as shown in Table 1. 
 
P1: Presence 
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For Baker, the first condition for a new policy frame to gain hold ‘is prior institutional and 
intellectual presence’, which provides ’an advantage in terms of institutional access and a 
body of prior work’ upon which to hook reforms (Baker, 2012: 121). We use presence to 
describe the way in which the imbalances procedures in the EU and G20 both to some 
extent drew potency from initiatives already circulating within their respective institutions 
(particularly the EU’s BEPGs) and beyond. In examining the first scoping condition, it is 
useful to turn to the IMF, an institution in which imbalance monitoring has had a far longer 
gestation period. The IMF’s primary activity since 1945 has been to provide funds to 
countries with debt or balance of payments difficulties as a result of temporary trade 
imbalances, in order to obviate the need for countries to adopt trade-distorting measures in 
response (Agarwal, 2012). Under Article 2, domestic imbalances form a core part of this 
mandate, with the articles of agreement amended in 1979 to call for ‘firm surveillance’ of 
members’ domestic policies (Moschella, 2014: 5). Already prior to the global financial 
crisis, the IMF launched the so-called Multilateral Consultations on Global Imbalances_ in 
mid-2006—involving China, the eurozone, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, a 
largely unsuccessful effort to foster cooperation amongst participating countries to address 
growing asymmetries while maintaining global growth (IMF, 2006). International concern 
over systemic risk is not new, especially as it pertains to imbalances between states. 
‘External review’ was a feature of the G20 since its inception at the Finance Minister level 
in 2000, when all countries agreed to ask the IMF and World Bank to examine whether 
their national financial rules complied with international standards and how they might be 
improved (Kirton 2005: 8). What changed considerably with the MAP, is the extended 
purview of this review beyond financial regulation. 
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The idea of systemic risk management was therefore present in the background before the 
crisis; but this does not necessarily account for how oversight came to be located in the 
alternate settings of the G20 and EU. In both cases, officials acted as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The epistemic community of the IMF is very close to the 
economic governance institutions of the EU and the G20. In the case of the MAP, the IMF’s 
strong institutional presence stands in contrast to the G20, which is not equipped with a 
bureaucratic machinery of its own: the secretariats (and indeed web-presence) change 
annually with every presidency, and working groups are non-permanent. Thus, the MAP 
relies on the IMF’s assistance in conducting surveillance. The IMF was no stranger to apex 
policy forums. Its expertise was increasingly sought as cooperation efforts between 
industrial countries grew from the 1980s onwards. Still, the G20 by formally recognizing 
the input role of the IMF, departed from the old G7 model where ‘the Fund participated 
only at the pleasure of the countries’ officials and had no real standing to guide the process’ 
(Boughton, 2001: 186). The G20 however continues the ‘fire-side-chat cum expert network 
model’ of the G8 (cf. Penttilä 2003: 150). 
Nonetheless, the fact that the G20 chose to create the additional architecture of MAP over 
and above what the IMF was already doing, indicates different motives for deploying 
imbalance regulation. This may be deemed to be partially the result of the perceived 
‘failures of IMF surveillance’, which have ‘attracted attention both within and outside the 
Fund’ (Moschella, 2014: 6). Indeed, while working with the IMF lends the aura of expertise 
to the G20’s MAP (author interview 12.4.2011), the fact that the initiative was spearheaded 
directly by governments offers the likelihood of more credible outcomes and stronger 
‘political ownership’ (G20, 2012). The trend here is towards state-centered cooperation 
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(Reisenbichler 2015). The IMF, for example is similarly lending as well as duplicating_ 
expertise to the reformed and rebranded Financial Stability Board (FSB), a key forum for 
international financial regulation, whilst the ownership rests clearly with the participating 
finance ministers. The same holds for the FSB’s predecessor, the Financial Stability Forum, 
which was established against the backdrop of the French proposal to create a strengthened 
committee within the IMF (ibid. 1012). 
Similar discussions on the risk of imbalances have occurred within Europe, where the 
European Payments Union – a precursor to the EEC – was founded as early as 1948 to 
subsidise Marshall Plan countries running a trade deficit (Gross, 2011). Maes locates 
concern over systemic imbalances on the EEC’s political agenda from at least the early 
1960s, viewed ‘very much from a balance of payments perspective, as balance of payments 
problems could threaten the common market project’ (Maes, 2004: 10). The most direct 
institutional precursor for the MIP can be found in the form of the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPGs), which were introduced in 1993 in the Maastricht Treaty (now Article 
121 TFEU). In their original statement, the BEPGs were focused around the desire to 
promote employment, growth and convergence in the Community (Commission, 1993), 
but in 1998 this mandate was extended to include country-specific guidelines for the first 
time. With the Lisbon Agenda of the year 2000, the remit further covered ‘the medium and 
long term implications of structural policies and on reforms aimed at promoting economic 
growth potential, employment and social cohesion’ (European Council, 2000: para 35). 
This period also brought about the implementation of the European Employment Strategy 
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in 19981, which sought to foster convergence around a set of goals for job creation. 
However, designed as it was in tandem with the Stability and Growth Pact, it set fiscal 
constrains above all else and therefore made it difficult for member states to engage in 
stimulatory labour market policies (such as allowing for early retirement) if necessary. 
Thus, although it sought to promote convergence, the vision of harmonisation it promoted 
did not allow for symmetrical adjustment, with both expansion and contraction. Whilst it 
may have served to prime the European arena for the MIP, it was equally emblematic of a 
way of thinking, historically prevalent in the Commission. 
The BEPGs, whilst superficially similar to the MIP, also had a blind spot with respect to 
imbalances. According to the European Commission ‘macroeconomic imbalances have 
been continuously monitored within the context of the EU's BEPG’ (COM, 2012). Yet, on 
reviewing the annual Council Recommendations on the BEPGs from 1996-2008, 
macroeconomic imbalances were addressed only once. Instead, the prescriptions under the 
BEPGs are a long-standing example of the EU taking the initiative on monitoring the 
domestic policies of member states (as, likewise is the European Employment Strategy). 
The BEPGs are highly embedded within the EU’s transnational architecture, as the 
guidelines to member states are ‘adopted by the Council of Ministers for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) and monitored through a system of multilateral surveillance 
involving the Commission and ECOFIN’ (Deroose et al., 2008: 828). This capacity 
building was to help grease the wheels for the MIP, as EU Member States were, in contrast 
to their G20 counterparts, well-used to scrutiny of and deliberation on domestic policies at 
                                                          
1The EES is now also conducted as part of the European Semester process. 
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the EU level (author interview 25.5.2011). 
Whereas some parts of the Six-Pack, notably the European Semester, had been on the 
Commission’s wish list pre-crisis, the MIP appears to represent a genuine rethink in 
economic governance for the EU. As one Commission official put it ‘we did not have a 
ready-made thinking on this’ (author interview 17.3.2015). This attitude partly derives 
from the conviction that monetary integration would itself be a cure for imbalances: ‘the 
single currency was expected to make balance of payments irrelevant between the euro-
area member states’ (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012: 1). Relying on market discipline as a 
cure for imbalances, the architecture of EMU was heavily influenced by the prevalent 
thinking of the 90s that ‘market forces would correct asymmetry’ (author interview 
18.3.2015, c.f. De Grauwe, 2000). There is evidence that this view was held outside of EU 
policy circles as well, notably within financial bond market participants (cf. Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas, 2012). When faced, however, with the paradigmatic challenge of the crisis, 
policy makers within the Commission drew on any available examples of solutions, 
including the MAP. Contrary therefore to Moschella’s account (2014), officials working 
on the design of the MIP in the Commission’s DG Ecfin did profess to take into account 
the existing literature, as well as previous initiatives from the IMF, the G20 and the 
European Stability Risk Board (author interviews, 14.3.2011, 25.5.2011, 17.3.2015, 
22.2.2017). This is further evidenced by the overlap in indicators used to assess imbalances 
(see above). 
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P2: Professional Positioning 
 
The second scoping condition refers to ‘an improvement in professional positioning and 
appeal’ (Baker, 2012: 124). In other words, new ideas can come to the fore in part because 
proponents became better placed within professional policy networks; we use this concept 
to address the role of political and institutional actors who used the crisis to foster 
imbalances initiatives and challenge existing asymmetries. We particularly focus on the 
status and recast priorities of the IMF, noting how the IMF’s agenda shift was mobilised 
by key political actors within the G20 and EU. Within both contexts we can see evidence 
of a shift leading to altered opportunities (and incentives) for policy advocates. The global 
financial crisis challenged the accepted wisdom of the Great Moderation and in so doing 
brought the issue of systemic global imbalances to the forefront of debate. Over the past 
half-century, adjustment in global imbalances was thought to occur ‘naturally’ through 
market action — a belief that was sponsored as much by the material interests of powerful 
proponents as by economic ideas (Drezner and McNamara, 2013: 158) and thus benefited 
from both distributive and ideational appeal. In the wake of the crisis, and following much 
soul-searching amongst both economists (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009; Claessens et al., 
2010; Griffith-Jones, 2010) and policy-makers (e.g. Almunia et al., 2010; Buti and Carnot, 
2013) this belief became replaced by a consensus that global imbalances accumulated over 
the years were a central element in precipitating the crisis. 
 
The IMF again took a central position in building a new understanding of imbalances and 
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provided a body of research underpinning the debate, including 23 Working Papers from 
2008-2014 on the issue. In so doing it was able to draw on its experience of surveillance 
stemming from the original Bretton Woods system mandate, which enlisted the fund to 
ensure that members ‘shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the 
international balances of payments of members’. The IMF is uniquely placed to provide 
information given its long-standing experience and its access to a near-universal 
membership of 188 governments, all of which are mandated as a requirement of 
membership to consult regularly with the Fund (Lombardi and Woods, 2008). The IMF’s 
‘expert status’ in analysing systemic risk was further heightened by the wide discrediting 
of private sector analysts and forecasters (Cooper, 2010: 276). Some observers have argued 
that the global financial crisis has led to a resurrection of the IMF, which a mere year before 
was struggling ‘to re-establish its legitimacy in the face of an unusual consensus between 
development critics, economists and central bankers that the IMF had virtually gone out of 
business’ (Gabor, 2010: 805). 
 
The resurrection of the IMF at the round-table of global crisis management and prevention 
was furthermore accompanied by a change in policy tone that favoured greater emphasis 
upon imbalances. This change was most pronounced with respect to the use of 
discretionary fiscal spending to fight the economic downturn, and subsequently a cautious 
and gradual attitude to fiscal consolidation after the immediate phase of the crisis which 
has placed it in conflict with some of its member governments (Broome, 2010; Clegg, 
2012; Lütz and Kranke, 2014; Ban, 2014). This was prompted not only by the events of 
2008 but also changes at the top of the IMF’s bureaucratic pyramid, namely the new 
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managing director (Dominique Strauss-Kahn), chief economist (Olivier Blanchard) and 
director of the Research Department (Carlo Cottarelli) (see Ban, 2014). Blanchard et al. 
(2013) typify this shifting attitude by concluding from the crisis that ‘countercyclical fiscal 
policy is an important tool’ in conditions of low inflation where there is little room for 
monetary manoeuvre. The shift in fiscal policy recommendations changed the terrain for 
actors to politicise global imbalances and the underlying issue of an (a)symmetric burden 
of adjustment. 
 
The reinvigoration of the IMF certainly suggests a strong professional positioning on the 
‘technocratic side’ of the MAP. Nonetheless, as their willingness to criticize governments 
over fiscal policy suggests, the political picture is more complicated (author interview 
13.4.2011). The G20 was dependent on existing institutions and associated sources of 
technical expertise to devise and implement the MAP (Eccleston et al., 2015: 7). This is in 
line with Baker and Carey’s claim (2014) that the delegation and associated endorsement 
of the G20 conferred legitimacy on IMF surveillance, as an issue that matched the Fund’s 
existing agenda. Nonetheless, the G20 was significant as a political vehicle for raising the 
status of imbalance initiatives, as it relied upon a smaller number of public figureheads, 
and in so doing moved beyond the IMF’s existing surveillance in terms not only of 
technical instruments, but also political competence. This is reflected in the division of 
labour as laid out by the former managing director Strauss-Kahn (Financial Times 
18.9.2009): ‘we need the G20 to put some steam behind this [MAP]. The G20 can provide 
the political leadership while the IMF can provide expertise and capacity’. 
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At the G20 level, two figures stand out in the creation of the assessment process. First, the-
then French President Nicolas Sarkozy took an important role in launching the G20 as a 
credible organization at the leaders’ level (author interviews 19.3.2011, 25.5.2011). During 
the initial crisis years he enjoyed high esteem among his peers, having helped to orchestrate 
both EU-level and international crisis summits to address the ramifications of the global 
fallout. Second, the incoming US President Barack Obama was welcomed by other G20 
leaders as the administration of the previous president ‘became increasingly willing to 
resort to unilateralism and disengaged from multilateral organizations when its interests 
were compromised’ (Kissack, 2010: 7). For the US government the MAP was a well-
received innovation as it distracted from the role the US had played in the global financial 
crisis and offered a blame-sharing approach to crisis diagnosis and eventual remedy (author 
interview 25.5.2011). It also provided a potential opportunity to decry Chinese policy (on 
what was perceived to be currency manipulation) having found IMF surveillance toothless. 
The establishment of the MAP during the Pittsburgh summit is a sign of both US leadership 
in this matter and of US interest. 
 
Sarkozy also played an important role at the EU level, where he and the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel co-authored a letter to the President of the European Council expressing 
(inter alia) their support for the MIP, and clamouring for the EU’s economic governance 
to be extended even further. In addition to a strong endorsement by the French government, 
the MIP met with broad consensus in the European Council where it gathered momentum 
at the political level (author interview 17.3.2011). In some respects, French support for the 
MIP is unsurprising, as MIP can be taken as an proxy for a policy goal – ‘gouvernement 
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économique’ – that successive governments have fought for over many years (Howarth, 
2007), and which German veto power has so far denied. Whilst MIP is not a mirror for 
France’s traditionally activist approach to macroeconomic policy which ‘in the context of 
EMU encourages French governments to seek to match the single monetary policy with 
some form of supranational economic governance’ (ibid.: 1062), it does nonetheless 
contain significant elements which pleased the French. Notably, it represents a much 
broader and multi-faceted approach to the ‘E’ in EMU than the SGP’s budget fetishism. In 
early debates over EMU, the French position aligned with Delors who sought to achieve 
‘balanced’ economic convergence around standards agreed by all member states (which is 
to say, not necessarily German standards), and states with trade surpluses, notably 
Germany, reflating to help those under pressure (Featherstone and Dyson, 1999: 142). 
 
Although accusations of predatory German export policies are therefore not a new feature, 
the debate about beggar-thy-neighbour policies intensified with the Great Recession and 
neutralised the taboo of criticising surplus countries. In the first act, Berlin was repeatedly 
accused of free-riding on other Member States’ stimulus policies, waiting ‘for other less 
well-placed countries to do most of the work and reaping the benefits once exports pick 
up’ (Financial Times 26.11.2008). In the second act, when the debate turned to fiscal 
consolidation, Germany faced criticism for its export-driven recovery strategy. In 2010, 
French criticism of the strong German trade surplus (again) made headlines. Jean-Paul 
Fitoussi, then adviser to Sarkozy, argued for example that ‘the German economic strategy 
built on growth of exports is uncooperative’ (Financial Times 16.2.2010). Along similar 
lines Christine Lagarde, then Finance Minister and later managing director of the IMF, 
 19 
called on Germany to curb its export surplus (Financial Times 15.3.2010). Interestingly, 
although she said that she spoke to German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble almost 
daily, she argued that ‘the issue of imbalances is not one we address readily’ (ibid.). Two 
years later the MIP provided a venue and framework to do just that. 
 
P3: Promotion and persuasion 
 
The third condition originates in crisis politics, where ‘the willingness of […] norm 
entrepreneurs to engage in the very action of promotion and persuasion…is particularly 
crucial’ (Baker, 2012: 124). We primarily use this to examine how exchange rate 
imbalances served to coalesce opinion and enable persuasion within the respective policy 
communities of MAP and MIP. Here, MIP policy makers drew directly on MAP as both a 
pilot experiment and a token for striking political bargains. For MAP, the promotion and 
persuasion at the technical (IMF) and the political (G20 leadership) levels are markedly 
distinct. The key difference lies in the understanding of what ‘systemic imbalances’ refer 
to and what the MAP should achieve. For the IMF, it represents a comprehensive 
assessment of a host of indicators that can indicate imbalances posing a risk to global 
recovery and the recurrence of crises. The Fund’s argument in favour of collective action 
advocates two types of rebalancing (IMF, 2013): internal rebalancing, that is short-term 
consolidation; and external rebalancing via external demand in deficit economies, matched 
by a stronger reliance on internal demand in surplus economies. This dual rebalancing logic 
sits well within the existing IMF framework and puts the Fund in a position to advocate 
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both fiscal consolidation and public investment depending on the imbalances profile. Thus 
the IMF’s position under the MAP does not amount to a paradigm shift in macroeconomic 
management like the one it experienced during the 1980s (see Ban 2014). The indicators 
used for the MAP assessment by and large match those already used in the Article IV 
Country Consultation. Yet, although the Article IV surveillance was based on groups of 
like-units (see Broome and Seabrooke, 2007), the MAP has a potentially larger naming and 
shaming function. Now a country group (7-9 countries) can be explicitly singled out for 
experiencing worrisome external, fiscal or private imbalances, with country groups 
suggesting good or bad company. 
Whereas the IMF embraced a broad reading of global imbalances, the political debates 
amongst the G20 leaders suggest a much narrower reading, notably one that focuses on the 
issue of exchange rates. This focus harks back to the Bretton Woods system, when the 
centre of multilateral policy constraint fell on member countries’ exchange rate policies, 
not on broader issues of macroeconomic management. The issue of beggar-thy-neighbour 
exchange rate policies survived this period, and exchange rate surveillance has since then 
been part of the Article IV process. The promotion of the MAP by US policy-makers 
focused on the exchange rate component of imbalances. Even prior to the financial crisis, 
US policy-makers searched for a political channel to decry Chinese exchange rate policies. 
The backbone of these efforts consists of the so-called ‘savings-glut’ hypothesis, according 
to which undervaluation of the Chinese renminbi led to the accumulation of large foreign 
exchange reserves mainly in the form of US government debt, keeping long term interest 
rates excessively low (Bernanke 2005). From loud demands for Chinese currency 
appreciation from the US administration (e.g. Geithner, 2010) to renewed debates about a 
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Plaza Accord II that would facilitate the appreciation of currencies in major surplus 
economies like China and Germany (Wang 2012), the debate on addressing global 
imbalances quickly turned into talks about another round of currency wars (Ahmed 2012; 
Huang 2010). 
Although the discourse of the current US administration on ‘bad, really bad’ Germans does 
not suggest as much, originally Germany was not the initial target of the US’s imbalances 
strategy. ‘Originally the issue of imbalances was a way for the US to bash China within the 
G20, yet for political reasons the Obama administration did not want to single out China 
and therefore Germany got in the line of fire as well’ (author interview, 12.4.2011). US’s 
accusations of Chinese exchange-rate manipulation were met with counter-attacks by 
Chinese policy-makers. The US, so the argument goes, was itself to blame because a loose 
monetary policy and the large capital inflows it provoked, led to upward pressures on the 
US-Dollar (Gnath and Schmucker, 2012). Germany and China furthermore pointed to 
recent developments in US monetary policy, namely quantitative easing. The German 
finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble (2010) commented that ‘it’s inconsistent for the 
Americans to accuse the Chinese of manipulating exchange rates and then to artificially 
depress the dollar exchange rate by printing money’. In the wake of the Federal Reserve’s 
announcement of a $600 billion bond-buying scheme in November 2010, many emerging 
markets and EU countries accused the US of worsening global imbalances. Quantitative 
easing, so their fear, would entice investors to borrow cheaply in US Dollars to buy 
emerging market assets in the hunt for higher returns (Financial Times 1.11.2010). Turning 
the tables, Ma Delun, a deputy governor of the People's Bank of China, voiced concerns 
that the Fed's program ‘may add risks to the global economic imbalance, put pressure on 
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emerging markets to adjust their international balance of payments and could also stir the 
formation of asset bubbles, all of which require our vigilance’ (Reuters 9.11.2010). 
Germany was by no means China’s only ally in fending of US attacks. The other BRICS 
countries have continually stood in solidarity with China. For instance, when Geithner 
attempted to enlist Brazil, he was rebuffed by the then Finance Minister, Guido Mantega, 
who insisted the United States was the source of imbalances (Chodor, 2017). Korea, itself 
no stranger to currency intervention, also came out to defend the Chinese government. 
Shortly before hosting the G20 Seoul Summit, its Finance Minister, Yoon Jeung-hyun made 
clear that ‘we may discuss for example the general approach toward foreign exchange rates 
[…] or the impact foreign exchange could have on the global economy. […] I do not believe 
that it is appropriate to have a discussion regarding the foreign exchange rate or level of a 
specific country’ (Reuters News, 23.9.2010). 
The support (rather than the subsequent hijacking) of the MAP by the US delegation 
represents a historical turn as ‘this is the first time the U.S. has agreed, even proposed, to 
submit itself to a structured, full peer-review process’ (Lombardi, 2010) — a shift that is 
in contrast to the difficulties during the 1970s in securing US agreement for the IMF 
surveillance framework. Nonetheless, commitment was not to survive long. Not only was 
the broader issue of internal and external rebalancing reduced to exchange rate policy, but 
also the promotion of the MAP faced competition in the calculus of action of policy-
makers, with issues as diverse as anti-corruption, climate change and Ebola crowding the 
G20 agenda. Expanding agendas also beset the G7 and the G20 Finance meetings: 
‘Terrorism on aircraft provided the spur for this “politicization” of the G20 in its third year, 
just as it had for the G7 Summit in its fourth year with the issue of “skyjacking” at Bonn 
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in 1978’ (Kirton, 2005: 12). At the 2009 Pittsburgh Leaders Statement the issue of 
imbalances (‘A Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth’) had been 
raised before discussing international financial regulation (Strengthening the international 
Financial Regulatory System’). Five years later the Leaders’ Communiqué from the 
Brisbane summit includes a mention of neither imbalances nor the MAP. 
In persuading member states to rebalance their economies, the assessment process faced 
the same enforcement problems that had plagued the IMF’s previous Multilateral 
Consultations on Global Imbalances_; as its policy recommendations were not legally 
binding it relied solely on countries’ willingness to participate with some commentators 
claiming that the G20 forum is a ‘toothless talkshop’ (Rachman, 2010; Wolverson, 2010), 
or a ‘defence club for national interests’ (author interview 17.3.2011). What is more, 
lacking clear policy-targets, non-compliance became more difficult to call out. The US had 
pushed hard during the Seoul summit for numerical targets to identify imbalances, notably 
a 4 per cent target for current account surpluses (which was blocked by Germany and 
China). A year later, the French delegation sought to secure an agreement on economic 
indicators during the 2011 Cannes summit, but no consensus was reached beyond that of 
soft indicative indicators covering 11 headline indicators supplemented by 18 auxiliary 
variables. Chinese and German negotiators mobilised enough pushback to block the US 
initiative and then were able to increase their profiles via later G20 summits in Hangzhou 
(2016) and Hamburg (2017). In contrast to the EU’s MIP, whose ownership rests with the 
European Commission, the G20’s MAP is a member driven process that s tands or falls 
with the commitment of participating countries. As countries are emerging with very 
different growth scenarios and policy challenges there is sign that the MAP has lost steam 
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(Faruquee and Srinivasan, 2014: 508, see also Callaghan 2013). 
Whilst the MAP has floundered, the promotion of the MIP at the EU level strongly 
benefited from the MAP’s prior institutional presence; it is therefore the case that the two 
scoping conditions of presence and promotion interact. First, the MAP put the issue of 
imbalances on the map of macro-economic policy coordination. By initiating this process, 
the G20 became an important forum to interpret both the origins of the global financial 
crisis and the correction of systemic risks. When the European Commission set forth to 
establish an imbalances procedure at the EU level, it was able to draw on the persuasion 
work surrounding the creation of the MAP. The MAP became a pilot for the EU to probe 
acceptance for the premise of symmetric adjustment from Germany, the largest surplus 
country of the Community. Second, EU negotiators achieved an agreement that the 
eurozone should be considered as a whole within the MAP when adjudicating on monetary 
and fiscal issues. This was an important concession for the German delegation. The 
eurozone as a whole is largely in balance. This then meant that the German account surplus, 
in contrast to China, would not be admonished on the G20 level. In protecting Germany 
from international reprimand, the European Commission was able to demand in turn 
support for a EU-level procedure (author interview 25.5.2011). 
 
P4: Plausibility 
 
Plausibility relates to ‘the question of whether the arguments and claims one makes are 
judged to be believable by others’ (Baker, 2012: 126). In this context, it relates to the 
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political traction in each institutional setting. In the case of both MAP and MIP, addressing 
imbalances has gained enough plausibility to be instituted as a policy initiative, but has not 
been sufficient to prevent a considerable degree of political antagonism swirling around 
such policies. MAP, given its weaker bureaucratic infrastructure, has been more decisively 
challenged in this regard than MIP, which addresses a more pressing problem for the 
eurozone. In the wake of the financial crisis global systemic imbalances became part of a 
larger policy shift. Yet, as the fog of the crisis lifted it became clear that G20 countries were 
affected differently both by imbalances and by the crisis itself. The role of imbalances in 
the US economy was for instance very different to that in Russia or Indonesia. This made 
a uniform reading difficult and policy initiatives less politically appealing at the national-
level — however strong the case for collective action. As the G20’s membership is 
composed of politically adversarial national governments without a central bureaucracy, 
actions taken under the MAP were always doomed to disappoint by some measure, either 
by antagonism or by ineffectiveness (due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms 
generating the same frailties as the IMF’s oversight). 
 
In its MAP related evaluations the IMF did present an effective reading of imbalances 
covering monetary, fiscal and financial policies (IMF, 2009; 2011; 2013). It furthermore 
placed emphasis on the role of both surplus and deficit countries (ibid.), which presents 
rather a novelty for multilateral policy cooperation. As early as 1941, Keynes bemoaned 
that adjustment under the old Gold Standard was ‘compulsory for the debtor and voluntary 
for the creditor’. He argued that the country possessing the favourable balance should be 
in a position to initiate most of the effort necessary to eliminate it, while ‘maintaining 
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enough discipline in the debtor countries to prevent them from exploiting the new ease 
allowed them’ (quoted in Davidson, 2009: 129). The Bretton Woods system functioned on 
the assumption that adjustment to imbalances was, at least in theory, symmetrical between 
debtor and creditor countries with international reserves and IMF assistance to serve as 
buffers to international shocks (Bordo, 2005). Nonetheless, both Bretton Woods and the 
global economic arrangements that succeeded it have been characterised by an asymmetric 
burden of adjustment, with the notable exception of the United States (ibid.). The IMF’s 
recent embrace of symmetric adjustment can therefore be seen as a relatively brave move. 
The Fund further gained credibility from the perceived modification of its policy advice on 
fiscal adjustment, which signalled its willingness to take on powerful governments 
pursuing contractionary policies. This attempt to strive for symmetry did not however 
translate into discussions at the G20 level and diminished the ‘plausibility’ of the MAP. 
Within the MIP (and EMU more broadly) the issue of asymmetric adjustment is likewise 
controversial. For national governments, the plausibility of the new policy instrument is 
likely to be conditional on the extent to which they are individually penalized for running 
imbalanced macroeconomic policies; this is especially the case when those policies are 
considered ‘virtuous’ by the standards of other regulatory instruments such as the SGP 
(author interview 12.3.2011). The MIP replicates this asymmetry as the scoreboard for 
discretionary intervention by the Commission sets current account balance thresholds at 6 
per cent for surplus countries and 4 per cent for deficit countries (see Moschella, 2014). 
For German officials furthermore the notion of imbalances has a qualitative component; as 
one (German) Commission official put it ‘the EU is experiencing imbalances because 
[other countries] import garbage from China, not because we export high quality machinery 
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to the rest of the world’ (author interview 25.5.2011). 
 
The aim of the MIP scoreboard is to filter countries that warrant in-depth studies, in order 
to determine whether the potential imbalances identified in the early-warning system are 
benign or problematic. Out of the countries selected for review in 2012, only the 
Netherlands and Sweden ran current account surpluses. Yet this was not the reason for their 
selection (the cause being concerns over private sector/household debt). A similar pattern 
emerges in the following year. The country selection of the EIP so far clearly shows that 
imbalances are considered ‘an asymmetrical problem’ (Schwarzer, 2012: 38) which places 
the burden of correction on the deficit countries. Hodson (2013) characterises this as ‘a 
politically convenient asymmetry given the reluctance of German authorities to 
countenance measures that could hinder the country's external competitiveness’. Note 
however that when MIP indicators where designed, Commission officials estimated that no 
country would breach the 6 per cent current account surplus in the foreseeable future 
(author interview 17.3.2015, 23.2.2017). 
 
Consequently, the decision of the European Commission to launch an in-depth review 
against Germany in November 2013 came as a surprise to many, not least to German 
officials who thought the 6 per cent criterion would leave them with enough of a margin. 
The Commission’s conclusions were predictably guarded: ‘Germany is experiencing 
macroeconomic imbalances, which require monitoring and policy action’ (COM(2014) 150 
final, 5.3.2014). This language is a feature of the MIP application across countries; in the 
first 2012 round of the MIB review, no country (not even Cyprus where a banking crisis 
 28 
erupted in the following year) was found to have excessive macroeconomic imbalances. 
The phrasing of country reports (‘very serious’ instead of ‘excessive’) suggests a cautious 
approach, so as not to alert financial markets and signal credit risks. In times of market 
crisis it became inappropriate ‘to call a spade a spade’ (author interview 16.3.2011). Along 
similar lines, the post-recession application of the SGP shows that Member States are 
hesitant to escalate the procedure (Hodson, 2013). The in-depth review of the German 
economy nevertheless makes for a very different reading then that of the previously 
identified surplus countries Sweden and the Netherlands. In its review the Commission 
(COM 2014) dissects Germany’s surplus position, pointing to subdued domestic growth, 
inefficient allocation of domestic resources, a lack of investment, labour costs and ‘the 
adverse effects on the functioning of the domestic economy and of the euro area’. The 
political sensitivity of the decision to place Germany under in-depth review is reflected in 
the fact that the final report is not only almost twice as long as the other 17 country reports, 
but lists more contributors then the in-depth reports for France, Spain, the Netherlands and 
Ireland combined. 
 
We have already established how the creation of the MAP was brought about by the global 
economic fallout of 2008, in line with the ‘crisis as opportunities for change’ literature 
(Chwieroth and Danielsson, 2013). The crisis cauldron of the MIP differs in this respect, 
as the creation of the EU level procedure was propelled both by the events of 2008 and 
subsequently the eruption of the European Debt Crisis in 2010 (author interview 
23.3.2011). Whereas the Eurozone Crisis gave urgency and plausibility to the creation of a 
new framework at the EU-level, the effect on the MAP was to draw important resources 
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away from the Process. As one EU official put it ‘we don’t need the G20 to deal with our 
own problems, we need the G20 so that the problems of other states don’t become our own 
problems’ (author interview 16.3.2011). By the same argument, the added value of the 
MAP for the EU diminished by 2010. EU policy leaders, be it the French, Spanish or the 
joint EU delegation, had previously been an important source of support for the US efforts 
to promote the MAP. With the future of the eurozone in peril, the MAP was demoted in the 
list of policy efforts addressed at the G20. 
Indeed imbalances are in general a problem for the EU (and eurozone in particular) to a far 
greater degree than the G20, due to higher levels of policy interdependence. Country-
specific booms or busts mean that cyclical conditions move significantly out of line with 
the common monetary policy, leading to misalignment. The monetary policy of the ECB 
exacerbates these booms and busts, with single interest rates being ‘too high’ for countries 
in recession and ‘too low’ for the booming countries. This means that collective plausibility 
for EU’s MIP is (much) higher than for the G20: quite simply, it addresses an evident 
problem. Consequently, there ‘was genuine appetite to have a more holistic view of 
potential weaknesses across the EU’ (author interview 25.3.2015). As Helleiner (2014: 79) 
observes, ‘During the first decade of the euro’s existence, Germany accumulated large 
surpluses while payments deficits emerged in a number of poorer Eurozone countries in 
response to differing rates of productivity growth, asymmetric shocks, and other diverging 
economic trends.’ This trend has been increasingly recognized as an existential risk for the 
eurozone. 
Regardless of how individual countries respond to being admonished by the MIP, it is 
incontrovertible that wider critical opinion has responded very positively to any attempt 
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(however limited) to address the broader governance problems of the eurozone. At the EU 
level this represents a substantial shift and broadening of the debate on macroeconomic 
policy coordination; ‘politically the MIP has established a dialogue where we look at both 
sides of the coin’ (author interview 17.3.2015). Perhaps less audible outside of the country, 
the discussion about imbalances and Germany’s contributing role in destabilising the 
Eurozone is now an important part of the political debate within Germany (e.g. Bundestag 
13.11.2014; Bundestag 9.9.2012; Bundestag 29.6.2013; Bundestag 26.10.2011) and public 
(FAZ 5.3.2014; die Zeit 8.11.2012; Süddeutsche 13.11.2013; Handelsblatt 8.12.2013; der 
Spiegel 12.3.2014). 
 
Although both procedures therefore started out as strikingly similar policy initiatives 
arriving at the ‘consolidation stage’ (Culpepper, 2008), their remit and appeal differs 
starkly. Whereas the MAP turned into the challenge of managing the co-existence of 
multiple national currencies, the MIP’s mission is to manage the challenges associated with 
a single currency, with imbalances presenting in different ways due to the presence of a 
single monetary policy. Although progress has not so far been as decisive as some 
commentators have demanded (falling far short of political union), the willingness of the 
eurozone to experiment with solutions such as MIP means that the regulatory framework 
is well-embedded within a broader landscape of policy. Whereas the notion of imbalances 
has infused EU economic governance post crisis, the G20’s MAP in contrast remains an 
isolated piecemeal exercise in the landscape of multilateral policy cooperation. 
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Conclusion 
 
In some respects, the MIP and MAP share more similarities than differences. Both are 
crisis-led initiatives to increase supranational (and inter-state) oversight of member states’ 
macroeconomic policies in order to decrease the potential for imbalances to build up 
between them. Both owe much to ideational precedents, set by the IMF’s and European 
Commission’s pre-crisis economic measures in the form of macroeconomic surveillance 
and the BEPGs respectively (neither of which were realistically sanctionable, but which 
provided members with prior experience of macroeconomic co-ordination). And both exist 
in a delicate state of balance between the interests of individual member states and the 
stability of the whole (or perhaps, the ability of central authorities to enforce compliance 
with stabilisation initiatives). Nonetheless, these superficial similarities also hide some 
important differences, as the use of Baker’s four ‘scoping conditions’ make clear. The two 
therefore shed light on the way in which institutional context itself shapes – through 
presence, professional positioning, promotion and persuasion and plausibility – the types 
of policies that emerge. In this context, we find that plausibility appears to be the most 
critical condition in separating the fortunes of the two initiatives, with starkly different 
outcomes across the two policies. These outcomes are summarized in Table 2 below. 
 
The backdrop of crisis against which both procedures rose to the fore, makes it very clear 
that the issue of imbalances has gained traction as an explicit reaction to the failures of 
existing regulation. In this respect, the sequence of the policy shift gains increased salience. 
The G20’s MAP owes its lineage to the IMF’s prior surveillance (and indeed its 
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bureaucratic capacity to the IMF directly), but the eagerness with which national leaders 
initially seized upon the initiative as a flagship policy for the new G20 suggests not only 
the contemporary utility of this policy frame, but also the perceived failure of the IMF’s 
existing work to deliver surveillance with the necessary bite (cf. Moschella, 2014). 
Likewise, the EU’s MIP shares many of the mechanisms of the BEPGs, together with some 
of the same aims. Yet it took two crises for member states to once again consider accepting 
a procedure in which the European Commission was granted the right of adjudication over 
the collective imbalances created by individual member states’ policies. In both cases, the 
initiatives seem to be partial revisions of these prior policies, with a much more targeted 
remit and situated more firmly in an institutional context in order to beef up their (hard and 
soft) sanctioning capacity. The perceived necessity of both of these actions can be attributed 
to crises: in the case of the MAP the global financial crisis of 2008, in the case of the MIP 
both the 2008 crisis and the European Debt Crisis. 
 
The MAP’s sidelining can be traced in part to the political mistranslation between the IMF 
and the G20 level. Whereas the IMF evaluation presents a comprehensive analysis of 
factors associated with systemic imbalances, the G20 discourse surrounding its 
implementation singled out the issue of exchange rates in the context of the Chinese surplus 
position. Although the EU’s imbalances procedure does not set out to treat surplus and 
deficit countries as equals, we argue that the first three rounds of its implementation give 
reason to be optimistic (for a dissenting view see Moschella, 2014). Analysing the new, 
comprehensive framework for addressing macroeconomic imbalances, we find evidence 
for a shift away from the one-sided treatment of deficit countries associated inter alia with 
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the Stability and Growth Pact. In the course of making this argument we adopted Baker’s 
scoping framework (2012) to illustrate the purchase of the policies and appraise the 
conditions of the current and future successes of both policies. What the experiences of the 
MAP and MIP clearly show is that, while ideas matter, so do institutional settings, political 
actors within them, and the sequencing of events. 
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Table 1: MAP and MIP indicators compared 
 
Policy MAP areas MIP indicators 
Indicators Domestic 
variables 
• Private sector debt as percentage of GDP with a 
threshold of 160 per cent 
• Private sector credit flow as percentage of GDP with a 
threshold of 15 per cent 
• Year-on-year changes in house prices relative to a Eu-
rostat consumption deflator, with a threshold of 6 per 
cent 
Monetary and 
fiscal policy 
• 3-year percentage change of real effective exchange 
rates based on Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) and Consumer Price Index (CPI) deflators, 
relative to 35 other industrial countries, with thresh-
olds of -/+5 per cent for euro-area countries and -/+11 
per cent for non-eurozone countries; 
• Percentage change over three years of the real effec-
tive exchange rate (REER), relative to 41 other indus-
trial countries (ICs), with thresholds of +/-5 to +/- 11 
per cent 
Fiscal policy • General government sector debt as percentage of GDP 
with a threshold of 60 per cent 
Labour 
markets  
• 3-year percentage change in nominal unit labour cost, 
thresholds of +9 per cent for eurozone countries and 
+12 per cent for non-eurozone countries 
• 3-year backward moving average of unemployment 
rate, with threshold of 10 per cent 
External 
development 
• Net international investment position as percentage of 
GDP, with a threshold of -35 per cent of GDP 
External 
variables 
• 3-year backward moving average of the current ac-
count balance as percentage of GDP, threshold of +6 
and -4 per cent of GDP 
• 5-year percentage change of export market shares 
measured in values, with a threshold of -6 per cent 
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Table 2: MAP and MIP compared according to the ‘4 Ps’ 
 
 MAP MIP 
P1: Presence High: the IMF had been 
conducting similar exercises 
under its surveillance programme, 
and implements the G20’s own 
surveillance.  
Medium: the BEPGs provided an 
intellectual toolkit for the MIP, but 
had been under-used, and 
Commission officials therefore 
regard MIP as a genuinely novel 
initiative.  
P2: 
Professional 
positioning 
Medium: Sarkozy and Obama 
initially built on the IMF’s 
heightened status to push the 
imbalances agenda, but rapidly 
shifted their attention after it 
failed to serve French and US 
interests successfully. 
High: both Sarkozy and the 
Commission were supportive of the 
initiative, and were able to build on 
the existing Commission 
infrastructure in order to build a 
policy with high salience.  
P3: 
Promotion 
and 
persuasion 
Low: focus on exchange rate 
imbalances between the US and 
China was to prove politically 
antagonistic and practically 
toothless. 
Medium: the Commission was able 
to buy support from member states 
by using the experiences of the MAP 
as both a pilot and a political 
weapon.  
P4: 
Plausibility 
Low: weak bureaucratic 
infrastructure ensured that even 
the technical credibility of the 
IMF was not enough to prevent 
the political hijacking of MAP. 
High: the Eurozone had a clearly 
pressing need for imbalances 
regulation and Commission 
architecture lent robustness in 
implementation. Furthermore, its 
creation drew political resources 
away from the MAP. 
 
 
